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ABSTRACT: ABSTRACT: To mitigate the challenges that Flash Event (FE) poses to IP-Traceback techniques, this 
paper presents an IP Traceback scheme for detecting the source of a DoS attack based on Shark Smell Optimization 
Algorithm (SSOA). The developed model uses a discrimination policy with the hop-by-hop search. Random network 
topologies were generated using the WaxMan model in NS2 for different simulations of DoS attacks. Discrimination 
policies used by SSOA-DoSTBK for the attack source detection in each case were set up based on the properties of 
the detected attack packets. SSOA-DoSTBK was compared with a number of IP Traceback schemes for DoS attack 
source detection in terms of their ability to discriminate FE traffics from attack traffics and the detection of the source 
of Spoofed IP attack packets. SSOA-DoSTBK IP traceback scheme outperformed ACS-IPTBK that it was 
benchmarked with by 31.8%, 32.06%, and 28.45% lower FER for DoS only, DoS with FE, and spoofed DoS with FE 
tests respectively, and 4.76%, 11.6%, and 5.2% higher performance in attack path detection for DoS only, DoS with 
FE, and Spoofed DoS with FE tests, respectively. However, ACS-IPTBK was faster than SSOA-DoSTBK by 0.4%, 
0.78%, and 1.2% for DoS only, DoS with FE, and spoofed DoS with FE tests, respectively. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Security focus includes preventing a security breach 
before it occurs, (Tamana & Bhandari, 2014), detecting a 
breach if it occurred and taking remedial actions, and 
identifying the cause of a breach when it is detected, (Shi, 
2017). When prevention fails then rectification of the damages 
and the search for its cause become necessary. Among network 
forensic methods often employed to determine the source of a 
cyberattack is the Internet Protocol (IP) traceback technique, 
(Deepthi & Arun, 2017). Different IP traceback schemes are 
available but their applications for tracing different cybercrime 
incidence is limited, (Patil & Devane, 2017). Denial of service 
(DoS) attack is a type of cybercrime that requires an IP 
traceback scheme that can discriminate it from normal network 
flows that transmit large data in a manner symptomatically 
comparable to DoS, (Bhandari et al., 2016).  
A DoS attacks like Ping of Death (PoD), (Malik & Singh, 
2015), or smurf attack, (Schmitz, 2013), disrupts the services 
of the attacked system by flooding it with tremendous data in 
order to prevent legitimate access to the services, (Gunasekhar 
et al., 2014). DoS is not used for stealing, eavesdropping, 
bridge privacy or to compromise data integrity on a system but 
to disrupt services. 
PoD attack is used to flood the victim with oversized 
packets. Packets larger than the 65,536 bytes (maximum 
allowable size by IP Protocol) are sent in fragments. 
Reconstructing the packet from the fragments will lead to 
memory overflow (Mary & Begum, 2017). Attackers would 
usually use spoofed source IP addresses making it difficult to 
trace its genuine source (Gunasekhar et al., 2014). PoD can 
simply be executed as distributed DoS (DDoS) attack by 
spoofing the sender address of the ping packet to be the 
victim’s address. On sending the ping to the network broadcast 
address, all the systems that receive the request will reply to 
the victim and exhaust its memory, (Gorla et al., 2015). The 
attacker only sends fewer attack packets with multiple effects 
that may be corresponding to the number of nodes that received 
the ping broadcast and send the echo reply to the victim. 
The task of improving IP traceback technique to be able to 
detect the source of a cyber-attack accurately is a continuous 
work because IP protocol does not directly support traceback, 
(Nur & Tozal, 2018). The time required to receive an adequate 
number of packets needed for reconstructing the attack path is 
considerably large. Thus, hindering the efficient performance 
of traceback schemes. Saurabh & Sairam, (2013) used a 
completion condition method to improve Probabilistic Packet 
Marking (PPM)’s reconstruction time. Deterministic packet 
marking (DPM) schemes have a scalability problem. Mark on 
demand (MOD) was used by (Yu et al., 2016) to mitigate the 
scalability problem of DPM.  
Flash event (FE) is caused by many legitimate users 
accessing the same service on a server at the same time. This 
may result in large traffic that can resemble a DoS attack. The 
traffic surge in a network caused by the flash event may be 
occurring repeatedly at a time of an event or suddenly at a 
specific time. An example of such repeated occurrence may 
happen if a network operator offers free browsing to its user 
for a limited period at a particular time of the day. It is most 
likely that there will be heavy traffic on the operator’s network 
at that free browsing period. Election periods also increase 
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network traffic during voting when unconfirmed results are 
circulated and when the authentic results are being announced. 
The surge due to a flash event can occur suddenly due to 
breaking news announcing a very important incidence, like the 
death of a president or a famous personality. Those situations 
described can bring large users online to access the 
information.  
Irrespective of whether the surge brings the network down 
or not, a flow-based Internet Protocol (IP) traceback scheme 
that detects attack traffic based on the amount of routing 
packets only will falsely accept edges in such network with 
flash event traffic surges as segments of attack path. The 
described cases are sources of false alarms in existing flow-
based IP traceback techniques used for detecting the source of 
a DoS attack. Kandula, et al., (2005), cited examples of 
different DDoS attacks crafted to mimic flash event. They 
called them CyberSlam attacks. CyberSlam attacks may not be 
traced correctly by IP traceback that does not have a special 
feature to differentiate different flooding traffics. It will make 
attacks source detectors that cannot differentiate a flash event 
surge from the DoS attack traffic to return wrong attack path. 
Nature-inspired algorithms are now used to solve complex 
computing problems, (Osman & Laporte, 1996). Nature-
inspired algorithms have superior performance in handling 
highly complex nonlinear models. Its significant advantages 
include the ability to combine the natural randomness in data 
pattern and rules to efficiently detect optimum solutions, 
(Prayogo et al., 2017). To mitigate the challenges that FE poses 
to IP-Traceback techniques, this work proposes an IP 
Traceback scheme for detecting the source of a DoS attack 
based on Shark Smell Optimization Algorithm (SSOA) called 
the SSOA-DoSTBK. The SSOA is used in the scheme for 
implementing a discernment policy to avoid false acceptance 
of the wrong path by ascertaining the nodes involved in 
retransmission of the attack packets during a hop-by-hop 
search. 
 
II. RELATED WORKS 
Artificial bee colony (ABC) was used to apply traffic flow 
information as a feature to find the attack route by Hamedi-
Hamzehkolaie et al., (2014). The intensive traffic flows of the 
attack packets are considered as the food resource the bees are 
exploring. The most probable attack path is considered to be 
the path explored by most bees based on the amount of nectar 
and closeness to the hive. The bees follow the traffic flow to 
reach a router. This makes the router with more DoS attack 
traffic flows to be selected. Simulated Rain Drop (SRD) was 
used by Bhagat & Pasupuleti, (2015) to develop a relay 
mechanism as a solution to mitigate distributed DoS in cloud 
computing. SRD is a swarm algorithm and it is used to cover 
the large area of Cloud computing. When a bottleneck is 
caused by a DoS attack in cloud computing, the SRD relay 
mechanism will search for the highest available throughput 
where data can be rerouted to avoid congested edges affected 
by the DoS attack.  
This solution only finds an alternative route for data 
rerouting in the presence of a DoS attack. Attack source 
detection was not the focus of the paper. Nature inspired 
algorithm based on modified Ant Colony System algorithm 
called ACS-IPTBK (Wang et al., 2016), has been used for an 
IP traceback scheme that can detect attack path with a 
minimum number of packets and without necessarily having 
complete network routing information. Each ant traverses an 
attack path. In addition to the global rule of the original ant 
colony optimization (ACO) used for ant evolution, ACS-
IPTBK adds a local rule for a deeper search. The ants drop 
pheromones on the path as they traverse it. The path traversed 
by the highest number of ants, which is the path with the 
highest amount of pheromones, is returned as the most 
probable attack path.  
An IP traceback mechanism using particle swarm system 
was proposed by Venkataramanan & Ravi, (2017). Particle 
swarm system is an enhanced Particle Swarm Optimization 
(PSO) algorithm with a local updating rule in addition to the 
global updating rule of the original PSO. The incorporated 
local updating rule is used to enhance PSO efficiency and 
avoid being trapped in local suboptimal solution, giving better 
results. This technique was able to reconstruct the attack path 
using fewer packets than needed by similar previous schemes 
and was able to trace the source of spoofed attack packets. 
Saini et al., (2017) developed a hybrid IP traceback mechanism 
using two nature-inspired optimization algorithms, namely, 
Ant Colony Optimization and Particle Swarm Optimization.  
The two optimization algorithms are swarm algorithms 
and known to be effective in solving combinatorial 
optimization problems. The PSO was used to improve the 
convergence rate and reduce the computational complexity of 
the ACO algorithm. Because ACO normally performs search 
operation on the basis of distance it is combined with velocity 
based PSO algorithm so that premature convergence can be 
avoided and faster convergence with lesser number of ants can 
be achieved. Thus, the scheme combined the distance metric 
from ACO with the direction and velocity metric from PSO to 
compute probability metric for the IP traceback process. The 
objective was to improve the traceback time and reduce the 
number of packets required by IP traceback. The scheme was 
able to find a more globally optimum solution for IP Traceback 
problem with improved convergence rate using fewer numbers 
of ant and particle agents. 
There are other solutions that did not employ a nature-
inspired algorithm. They include a dynamic deterministic 
packet marking (DDPM) proposed by Yu et al., (2016), using 
the mark on demand (MOD) approach to make DDPM scalable 
and ease its implementation. Another one is Extended Entropy 
Metric (EEM) for DDoS flooding attack detection and IP 
traceback, called E-LDAT proposed by Bhuyan et al. (2016). 
They calculated EEM for each distribution of source IP 
addresses and compared the calculated EEM values against a 
threshold value set for the distributions to determine the 
occurrence of attack after which NetFlow is then used to trace 
its source. 
The existing solutions for DoS attack source detection that 
employ nature-inspired algorithms use swarm algorithm 
agents for flow-based detection. However, these techniques do 
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not consider the flash event that can cause a sudden surge in 
legitimate traffic flow in different segments of the network. 
 
III. METHOD AND MATERIALS 
SSOA-DoSTBK simulation was developed in NS2. Ping 
and messaging agents were set up using OTCL classes. 
Messaging is used for generating normal network transaction 
between other nodes. While the Ping agent is used to generate 
the ping of death attack by a randomly selected attacker on a 
randomly selected victim. Other communication protocols or 
agents including TCP, FTP, CBR are implemented for 
different other network transactions occurring concurrently on 
the network. 
The network consisted of 25 autonomous systems with 8 
nodes each was defined using the TCL code. The topology 
used for the simulation was generated in the simulator using a 
random topology simulator written in TCL language of the 
NS2. The random topology simulator placed the 200 nodes at 
random coordinate points in the network area.  The WaxMan’s 
connectedness probability, p, is used to establish connection 
links attributes which include transmission rates and 
bandwidth between nodes based on their distance apart. 





   (1) 
In eqn (1), d(i,j), is the distance apart between the nodes, 
L is the longest possible distance between any two nodes, η 
and γ are constant fitting parameters, i and j are the relative 
coordinates of neighbouring nodes. The values of η were 
iterated from the sequence [0.3, 0.6, 0.9, 1.2, 1.5] for different 
generations of the simulation. The value γ = 0.1 was used for 
all simulations.  
Parameters given in Table 1 are unique to the attack 
packets. They can be used to identify the packets flow on 
ingress upstream routers. They are extracted and stored in x0 
with their corresponding assigned weights. In the first column 
of Table 1 are the parameters that can be found on real-life 
routers, e.g. Cisco routers flow records, (Cisco.com 2009). The 
second column contains their equivalent in NS2 that were used 
for the simulation. 
Table 1: Weight values assigned to discrimination parameters.  
Parameter NS2 Parameter Value 
ICMP Pkt_Type 4 
IP-ID Pkt_Id 5 
Packet-Length Pkt_sz 1 
Dst IP address Dst_Node_Id 4 
Pkts Packets_Count NV 
Active Host_log_Time  1 
NextHop Next_hop_node 2 
                        NV = No Value 
The parameter that has the highest value of 5 is the 
parameter that uniquely identifies the flow. The parameters 
packet type and destination address must be the same for all 
packets of the flow, though they are not unique to the flow, 
they were assigned 4. The weighting value of 2 is assigned to 
Dst Port Msk AS and NextHop address because many other 
packets forwarded by the same hop will have the same value. 
The NextHop address can only change for packet routed after 
the routing table of the hop has changed. The parameters 
assigned a weight value 1 are the ones that can be changed by 
the attacker such as MAC address and the Packet length. 
Server active time is assigned weight value 1 because it does 
not tell much about the attack route. The number of packets 
forwarded by the hop within the time frame is not assigned 
value because it includes other packets that are not attack 
packets. It is used only to estimate traffic on the hop within the 
time frame. 
The IP traceback scheme proposed in this paper examines 
the flow traffics on each hop by focusing on those traffics that 
have the IP address of the attacked system as their destination 
address. The parameters with weight values 5 are the 
parameters first searched. The amount of attack packets 
forwarded by each neighbouring node j is estimated as follows; 
𝜒𝑒 = ∑ (𝑥𝑒,𝑘 ∩ 𝑥0) 
𝐾
𝑘=1    (2) 
The header parameters of each packet, k, that was transmitted 
from a neighbouring node, j, connected by an edge, e, is 
denoted as 𝑥𝑒,𝑘. Every 𝑥𝑒,𝑘 were examined against the 
discrimination policy, 𝑥0, up to the total packets, K, using eqn 
(2). The total weights of matching parameters estimated for 
each neighbouring node is store in 𝜒𝑒  in eqn (2). A sample of 
attack path reconstruction is shown in Figure 1. The returned 
attack path from the victim to the attacker consists of the 
yellow edges. The attacked node is the one that is dropping 
packets in the figure. 
 
         Figure 1: Attack path reconstruction. 
A.  Performance Evaluation 
The performance of the developed scheme was compared 
against the performance of ACS-IPTK. Performance of the 
scheme was estimated based on the correctness of the returned 
path when the simulated attacks were traced back to the 
attacker under different conditions. 
The average attack packet on path returned by the scheme 
in consideration was indicated as atkPktAve. The total packets 
routed on the returned path within the time frame in focus was 
represented as pktTot. The percentage correctness of the path, 
Peff, was calculated as 
Peff =  
𝑎𝑡𝑘𝑃𝑘𝑡𝐴𝑣𝑒
𝑝𝑘𝑡𝑇𝑜𝑡
 × 100%  (3) 
In eqn (3), Peff indicates the accuracy of the returned path in 
terms of the number of attack packets found on the path. The 
 
 
SALAMI et al:  DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNET PROTOCOL TRACEBACK SCHEME                                                                               173                                                                             
*Corresponding author: salami.af@unilorin.edu.ng                                         doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/njtd.v16i4.4 
 
Figure 2: Relative FER of SSOA-DoSTBK and ACS-IPTBK. 
difference between the percentage average performance of 
SSOA-DoSTBK and ACS-IPTBK indicated as  
PDiff(%) =  
SAVE−AAVE
AAVE
× 100%   (4) 
where SAVE and AAVE are the average results obtained for 
SSOA-DoSTBK and ACS-IPTBK, respectively, in a test. 
PDiff in eqn (4) is the estimated percentage improvement of 
SSOA-DoSTBK over ACS-IPTBK. 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The proposed IP traceback scheme for the source of DoS 
attack detection was tested on False Error Rate (FER), the 
accuracy of the attack path returned, and the convergence time. 
The three tests were performed at three different conditions; 
first, when only DoS attack is generating traffic in the network, 
second, when FE and DoS attack traffics are present, and third, 
when spoofed DoS attack with FE traffics occur together in the 
network. The results were compared with ACS-IPTBK model. 
Figure 2 shows the relative performances of the proposed 
scheme and the benchmark in FER tests. 
 
 




(b) FER for SSOA-DoSTBK and ACS-IPTBK for DoS and FE. 
 
 
(c) FER for SSOA-DoSTBK and ACS-IPTBK for Spoofed DoS 
and FE. 
 
The results of the tests for the correctness of the path returned 
in terms of the number of attack packets on the returned path 
are shown in Figure 3. 
 
(a) The correctness of the paths returned in the presence of DoS only. 
 














































































































































































174                                                                    NIGERIAN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT, VOL. 16, NO. 4, DECEMBER 2019 
 
*Corresponding author: salamiow@gmail.com                                                                 doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/njtd.v16i4.3  
 
(c) The correctness of the paths returned in the presence of Spoofed 
DoS and FE. 
Figure 3: Relative Correctness of SSOA-DoSTBK and ACS-IPTBK. 
Figure 4 illustrates the convergence of SSOA-DoSTBK 
compared to ACS-IPTBK. ACS-IPTBK converged slightly 
faster than the proposed scheme in the tests. 
 
(a) Convergence of SSOA-DoSTBK and ACS-IPTBK for DoS only. 
 
(b) The convergence of SSOA-DoSTBK and ACS-IPTBK for DoS 
and FE. 
 
(c) The convergence of SSOA-DoSTBK and ACS-IPTBK for spoofed 
DoS and FE. 
Figure 4): Relative convergence of SSOA-DoSTBK and ACS-IPTBK. 
 
B.  Comparison of the Quantified Results 
The comparison is used to evaluate the functionality and 
efficiency of the SSOA-DoSTBK over ACS-IPTBK. The 
quantified comparison values in Table 2 shows that the 
proposed scheme outperformed ACS-IPTBK in FER and 
Performance tests by, at least 5.2% in the worst condition and 
as much as over 32% in the least challenging condition. It also 
compared favourably with ACS-IPTBK in terms of 
convergence time by recording a convergence time with a 
negligible difference compared to the time recorded by ACS-




Deep search for attack flow was implemented on ingress 
hops using discrimination policy developed based on details 
extracted from the attack packets. The discrimination policy 
was used in a hop-by-hop search to determine the most 
probable hops involved in forwarding the attack packets from 
the attacker to the victim. This was aimed at reducing errors in 
the attack path reconstruction that may cause failure to detect 
the attack source. 
The proposed scheme was implemented in the NS2 
version known as ns2-allinone-2.35. It was used for attack path 
reconstruction under different conditions with ordinary DoS 
attack alone, when DoS attack and flash event surges were 
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Table 2: SSOA-DoSTBK Convergence compared with ACS-
IPTBK. 












Spoofed DoS+FE -1.2 
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packets was present together with FE surge traffic on the attack 
path. The performance of the developed scheme was measured 
based on false error rate, the number of attack packets on the 
returned path, and convergence time. The developed scheme 
recorded 31.8%, 32.06%, and 28.45% lower false error rate for 
DoS only, DoS with FE, and spoofed DoS with FE tests, 
respectively.  
It also recorded better efficiency in terms of the 
correctness of the attack path returned by 4.76%, 11.6%, and 
5.2% higher performance in attack path detection for DoS 
only, DoS with FE, and spoofed DoS with FE tests, 
respectively. But the ACS-IPTBK was faster than SSOA-
DoSTBK in the attack path reconstruction by 0.4%, 0.78, and 
1.2% for DoS only, DoS with FE, and spoofed DoS with FE 
tests, respectively. 
The test results show that ACS-IPTBK deviated further 
than SSOA-DoSTBK from the true attack path. SSOA-
DoSTBK is also more effective for detecting the source of 
spoofed IP attacks. The time difference between SSOA-
DoSTBK and ACS-IPTBK convergence was negligibly small. 
The ACS-IPTBK operates on the basis of parallelism whereby 
different agents examined different segments of the network 
concurrently, but SSOA-DoSTBK operates a hill-climbing 
search. ACS-IPTBK examined more areas most of which are 
not on attack path but SSOA-DoSTBK narrowed its search to 
the relevant area based on defined heuristics. 
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